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Department of  Economics, Princeton University Abstract 
The interaction bietween knowledge and belief in a temporal context is 
analyzed. An axiomatic formulation and semantic characterization of the principle 
of  belief persistency implied by the standard conditionalization rule are provided. 
This  principle says that  an  individual does  not change  her  mind  unless  new 
evidence forces her to do so. It is shown that if beliefs are conscious (or state- 
independent) and satisfy negative introspection then the principle of persistency of 
beliefs is characterized by the following axiom schema: the individual believes 
that 9 at date t if and orilly  if she believes at date t that she will believe that 4 at 
date t+l. 1.  Introduction 
In  the  analysis  of  economic  models  with  imperfect  information  the  theorist 
ascribes two kinds of (non probabilistic) beliefs to the agents, which correspond to two 
nested epistemic levels: 
(i) "hard"  beliefs, given 'by  the information that can be actually acquired in the 
economic interaction (usually described by means of information partitions), and 
(ii) "soft" beliefs, representing what an agent is sure of in each specific situation 
(although the information actually acquired may  be  per se insufficient to  obtain such 
certainty). 
For example, in a discretle game in extensive form "hard" beliefs are given by the 
information  sets,  and  ''soft"  beliefs  are  represented  by  the  set  of  nodes  in  each 
information  set  having  positive  conditional  (subjective)  probability.  It  is  normally 
understood that "hard" beliefs represent justified or veridical knowledge while ''soft" 
beliefs might be arbitrary (as is the case in non equilibrium solution concepts such as 
rationalizability) and  at most represent inferred knowledge that cannot be  justified by 
observation alone. Following thjis interpretation, we adopt the convenient terminology of 
calling "hard" beliefs knowledge and "soft" beliefs simply beliefs. 
It may  be  argued that the distinction between knowledge and  beliefs is not so 
clear-cut  because any kind  of  epistemic state is necessarily hypothetical and,  to some 
extent, unjustified.'  Even mere observations are "theory laden" and to consider them as 
1 In their textbook on game theory Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 135) write: "In our view a 
model should attempt to capture the features of reality that the players perceive; it should not necessarily 
aim to describe the reality that an outside observer perceives, though obviously there are links between the 
two perceptions". hard facts is at best an abstraction.'  Yet, there is a crucial difference between the two 
epistemic  levels  mentioned  above.  Although  the  actual  information  acquired  in  an 
economic interaction may be endogenously determined by  the solution of the model, the 
information structure - semantically, what an agent knows at each state of the world - 
is exogenously given as part of the description of the model itself. On the other hand, the 
(soft) beliefs of an agent are endogenously determined by the solution of the model. They 
depend on the particular solution concept used and, for a fixed solution concept, on such 
fundamentals as the preferences of the agents.  For example, for each information set of a 
(discrete) game  the set  of  nodes with  positive  conditional probability depend  on the 
equilibrium strategies. 
A number of recent papers have shown that it is useful to analyze the epistemic 
aspects of decisions and social interaction using the tools of  modal logic.3 Modal logic 
provides  a  rich  and  flexible  framework  for  a  rigorous  definition,  discussion  and 
characterization of epistemic as'sumptions. We are interested, in particular, in the analysis 
of  the interaction between  howledge and  belief  in  dynamic  decision  problems  and 
games. In this paper  we  take a first step in this direction by  providing an axiomatic 
formulation and a semantic chsuacterization of the minimal properties of  beliefs implied 
by the standard conditionalizatjon rule. 
Consider an individual who in each period of time t may  receive a new piece of 
information. In the standard semantic representation used by economists there is a set of 
2 The conjectural character of all knowledge is the central tenet of the epistemological approach 
broadly called critical rationalism (see, for example, the volume edited by Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). 
For  a  list  of references see the  special  issue  of  Theory and  Decision on "Logic and  the 
epistemic foundations of game theory" (1994, Vol. 37). states and a sequence of  information partitions.4 If the individual assigns conditional 
(subjective) probabilities to  the  states,  her  beliefs correspond  to  the  support of  her 
conditional probability  measure. Let S be  the support at time t and  let H be the new 
information  set  at  time  t+l. The  standard  conditionalization rule  says  that,  if  the 
intersection Sn  H is non-empty, then Sn  H must be the new support. Epistemically, S 
corresponds to the conjunction of all the propositions that the individual believes with 
certainty at t (that is, the conjectural theory of the individual at t) and H corresponds to 
the conjunction of all the proposiitions that she knows at t+l. The conditionalization rule 
implies that,  as  long  as  what  the  individual  actually  knows  does  not  contradict her 
conjectural theory, she continues to believe in it and simply adds to it the propositions she 
has learned to be true. This captures an  informal epistemic principle  of  persistency of 
beliefs: an individual does not chmge her mind unless new evidence forces her to do so. 
The conditionalization rule is illlustrated  in  Figure 1,  where  thick  lines  represent  the 
information  partition of  the  individual (her  knowledge)  and  thin lines  represent the 
support of  her subjective conditional probability distribution (her beliefs). Thus, if the 
true state is, say, w,,  then at time t the individual knows (is informed) that the state is 
either w4 or w5 or W,  and her subjective belief is that the true state is either w4 or w5 
(she is "certain" that the true state is not w6). At time t+l she learns (is informed) that the 
true state is not w,.  By  the conclitionalization rule she must now attach probability 1 to 
state w,. 
5 
4 Usually it is assumed that, as time progresses, the individual is given more information, that is 
her knowledge increases (she learns). This assumption is translated into the property that the information 
partition of the individual at time t+l is a refinement of her information partition at time t. 
Similarly, if the true state is w3,  the individual knows, at date t, that the state is either wl or w2 or 
w3 and she attaches positive probability to all three. If at date t+l she learns that the true state is not w,, 
then she must attach positive probability to both w2 and w3. time  t  time  t+l 
Figure  1 
Despite the  apparent  simplicity of  the  principle of  persistency of  beliefs,  an 
axiomatic formalization in  ternls of modal logic is not so straightforward. For example, 
the following axiom schema has been proposed (cf. Kraus and Lehmann, 1988):~ 
(PB)  8  at date t, the i,ndividual believes that 4, then  at date  t+ 1 either she 
knows that  4  isj'hlse or she still believes that 4. 
6 (PB) corresponds, in the kamework of ow paper, to axiom schema (A2  1) in Kraus and Lehmann 
(1988, p. 107). The difference between their approach and ours is that we analyze situations where "the 
objective state of the world" does inot  change over time: the only thing that changes over time is the 
epistemic state of the individual. Thus time enters our analysis only through the knowledge and belief 
operators. In particular, unlike Kraus and Lehmann (1988), we do not have a time operator 0,  where OI$ 
would be interpreted as "at the next date I+". It easy  to see that, in  non trivial models,  this axiom schema is unacceptable. 
Suppose that at date t the individual believes that both  P and Q are true, and at date t+l 
she learns that either P or Q is fdse, but according to her new knowledge neither P nor Q 
can be ruled out as false.  By  (PIB),  the individual must believe both P and Q at t+l, but 
this belief contradicts her knowledge. The problem with (PB) is that persistency of beliefs 
is postulated for every proposition believed by the individual. No problem would arise if 
persistency of beliefs were postulated for a single, specific proposition R. For example, 
there are solution concepts for dlynamic games relying on the informal assumption that 
every  player believes that the opponents are rational, as long as she does not observe 
behavior inconsistent with ration(a1ity  (see, for example, Pearce, 1984; see also Kraus and 
Lehmann's, 1988, analysis of the "muddy children puzzle"). 
While postulating persistency of beliefs for specific propositions is an approach 
worth pursuing for the epistemic: analysis of dynamic economic models, it falls short of 
characterizing the basic notion of persistency implied by the conditionalization rule. Our 
previous discussion suggests that persistency  of  beliefs should  be  postulated for  the 
composite proposition given by  the conjunction of all the propositions believed by  the 
individual, i.e. the theory of the individual. However, it is usually the case that the theory 
of the individual is given by an infinite set of propositions and an infinite conjunction of 
propositions is not a well-formed formula in the formal language of propositional (modal) 
logic. Thus  we cannot formally use an axiom like "If T is the individual's theory at t and 
T is consistent with what the individual learns at t+l, then the individual believes T at 
t+l." We solve this problem by showing that, given other standard axioms and inference rules for  knowledge and  belief, the rule of conditionalization is characterized by  the 
following axiom schema: ' 
(PB') The individual b(e1ieves  that  i$  at date t ifand only ifshe believes 
at date t that she will believe that  i$  at date t+  1. 
The formal language that we put  forward in  Section 2 is the one that comes 
closest to the dynamic models developed in the information economics literature. In 
particular, we restrict our analysis to situations where the objective state of the world 
does not change over time,  thit is, the truth value of the atomic propositions (which 
provide a factual description of the world) is constant over time. The only thing that 
varies with time is the epistemic: state of the individual, that is, what the individual knows 
and believes about the world. Thus time enters our analysis only through the knowledge 
and belief operators. 
The paper is organized (as follows. In Section 2 we develop the formal analysis. 
Section  3  contains  an extended  discussion of  the  main  result.  Section  4  contains  a 
conclusion and a discussion of related literature. 
7 In particular, we require that beliefs be state-independent or conscious ( if the individual believes 
that I$ then she knows that she believes that 4) and that they satisfy negative introspection (if the individual 
does not believe that 4 then she believes that she does not believe that 4). 
The reader might have noticed the formal similarity between this axiom and the law of iterated 
expectations. 2. Characterization of belief persistency 
Let T c  N (where N is the set of non-negative integers). We consider a logic with 
two modal operators for every t~ T:  Bt and Kt. The intended interpretation of B,4 is "at time 
t the individual believes that 4"  and the interpretation of Kt$ is "at  time t the individual 
knows9  that +".lo  The alphabet of the language consists of: (1) a finite or countable set 
ll  = {n,, n2, ...) of sentence letters (representing atomic propositions), (2) a set T c  N of 
dates satisfLing the property that if t~ N and t+l~  T then t~ T, (3) the connectives 1  (for 
"not"),  v (for "or"), and, for every t~ T, Bt and Kt,  (4)  the  bracket symbols ( and  ).  A 
word  is a finite string of elements of the alphabet. The set @ of  formulae is the subset of the 
set of words defined recursively ;is follows: 
(i)  for every sentence: letter IT,  (IT)€  0, 
(ii)  if  4 E 0 then  (T(~)E  0,  and, for every t E T,  (Bt$)  E 0  and (Kt$)  E 0, 
(iii)  if   WE@  then  (+vw)E@. 
As is customary, we shall often omit the outermost brackets (e.g. we shall write 4 v~ 
instead of (4 v~)).  Furthermore, we  shall use the following metalinguistic abbreviations: 
$  A  for  l(l4 v  1~)  (the  symbol  A  stands  for  "and")  and  4  + y~  for 
(1$)  v w  (the symbol -+  stands for "if. ..then.."). 
As explained in the introduction, the distinction between Kt and Bt ought to be thought of as a 
distinction between "hard" beliefs (not necessarily knowledge) and "soft" beliefs. In particular, our main 
result does not require the  Axiom of Tiuth for Kt : Kt+ +  4. 
LO As  explained in  the introduction, our aim is to analyze situations where the only thing that 
changes over time is the epistemic state of the individual: the factual statements that describe the world do 
not change with time. Thus time enters our analysis only through the knowledge and belief operators. We  denote  by  K'~~  the  system  or  calculus  specified  by  the  following axiom 
schemata and rules of inference: 
(1)  All the tautologies (that is, a suitable axiomatization  of propositional calculus), 
(3)  the rule of inference Modus Ponens: 
(4)  the rule of inference Necessitation: 
for every t E T, 
for every t E T. 
We now turn to the semmtics.  A standardpame is a tuple 
(1)  W is a set of worlh  or s,tates,  whose elements are denoted by u, v, w ... 
(2)  T c_ N is such that if  t~ N and  t+l~  T then t~ T. 
(3)  For every t E T, Kt is a binary relation on W (intuitively vKtw  means that, at 
time t, if the true state is v then the individual considers w possible, i.e. cannot 
rule out w). (4)  For every te  T, Bt is a binary relation on W (intuitively vBtw means that, at time 
t, if the true state is v then the individual considers w likely, that is, attaches 
positive probability to w)  . 
A standard model is a tuple  ?I7 = (w, T,  {t}t  , {Bt),ET,  f ) where 
(w, T, {r}teT,  {23t}tET  ) is a standard be  and f : ll+ 2W  (2W  denotes the set of 
subsets of W).  For every propositional variable n, fi)  is the set of worlds at which n: is 
true. We say that W is based on the kame (  W,  T,  {B~),~,  ). 
Given a formula 4 and a standard model  W = (w,  T,  {3(,),€  T,  {q),.  T, f ), the 
truth set of 4 in W, denoted by  111  4 1)  is defmed recursively as follows: 
m 
(1)  If 4 = (n) where :rc  is a sentence letter, then  11 $11  = f(n), 
m 
(2)  )174~Im=  W-II$II~(~~~~~S,II~$II~  isthecomplementof(($II ) 
m 
(3)  I19vwII  = ll0llrnu  IIwIIrn, 
(4)  For all t~ T 
11 K,~(I~={UE  w : forallvsuchthatuX,~,  vs  II$II~],  and 
11 B,$  1) '=  { us  W : for all v such that uBtv,  VE  11 I$  11  ]. 
If  vs  11 411 " we say that  4 is true at world v in model  W.  An alternative notation 
m  for  VE  11 4 11 " is  c '  4  and. an alternative notation for  ve 11 $  11  is  I#"  4. A formula 
v  v 
4 is valid in model  ?I7 if and only if  C '  4  for all vs  W.  v Let P be a property of tlhe relations B, and/or the relations K,  and o  be an axiom 
schema We say that o is characterized by property P if:  (i) every instance of o is valid in 
every model based on a frame that satisfies praperty P, and (ii) given a he  that violates 
property P, there exist a model W  based on it and an instance + of o  that is not valid in  W  . 
For example, it is well known (see Chellas, 1980) that axiom schema (known as negative 
introspection)  7Bt+ +  BtlB,+ (respectively, TK,+ +  KtlKt+)  is characterized by  the 
property that  Bt (respectively, X,)  is euclidean," axiom schema (known as positive 
introspection) B,+ +  BtBt+ (rc;spectively, Kt+ +  KtKtQ) is characterized by  the property 
that I3, (respectively, Kt)  is transitive,  axiom schema Kt+ +  +  (known as veridicality) is 
characterized by the property that .Kt is reflexive, etc. 
We are interested in the system obtained by adding the following axiom schemata 
to the system K'I.. 
(Al) says that if at date it the individual believes that she will believe that 4 at 
date t+l, then she must believe that 4 at date t. (A2) says the converse: if she believes that 
Q at date t, then she must also be:lieve, at date t, that she will believe that + at date t+l. 
(A3) says that beliefs are conscious: if the individual believes that + then she knows that 
she believes this. 
" Recall that Bt  is euclidean if uBtv  and uqw  implies vBtw. P  R 0  P 0  S l T I0  N I . The following characterization holds 
Axiom schema (Al) is characterized by the following property 
(Rl)  V U,VE  W, V t~ T,  if uBtv and (t+l)~  T then 3  WE W such that uStw and  wBt+,v. 
Axiom schema (A2) is characterized by the following property 
(R2)  V U,V,WE  W, V t E  T,  if  uBtv and  vBt+,w then  uBtw. 
Axiom schema (A3) is charircterized by the following property 
(R3) Vu,v,w~  W,VteT, if  uXtv and  vlB,w then uBtw. 
Proposition 1 can be see13  as an application of Theorem 4.3 (c and e) in van der 
Hoek (1993, p.  183).12 For the rc:ader3s convenience, and because van der Hoek does not 
provide a complete proof, we give the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix. (Note that 
van der Hoek's analysis has a co:mpletely different focus from ours: he investigates the 
atemporal relationship between Icnowledge and belief, in particular, the maximal 
"consciousness"  conditions  com~patible  with the non-collapse of  belief into knowledge.) 
Our objective in this paper is to provide an axiomatic characterization of the 
notion of belief persistency corresponding to the rule of conditionalization. Semantically, 
the notion that beliefs are persistent - that is, an individual keeps on believing her 
previous theory until she knows it is false -- is captured by property P which is the 
conjunction of the following two properties: 
(PI)  V U,VE  W, V t~ T, if  uBtv and  uKt+,v then uBt+,v, 
l2 We are grateful to Joe Halpern for bringing this paper to our attention. (P2)  Vue  W,VteT,  if  3ve  WsuchthatuBt+,v and  notuBtv  thenb'w~  W 
if uBtw then not ILK~+~W. 
Property (Pl)  says that if v is bellief-accessible from u at time t and is knowledge- 
accessible from u at time t+l, then it is also belief-accessible at time t+l  .  Thus property 
(PI) rules out arbitrary contractions of the belief set (cf. Figure 1).  Property (P2) says 
that if, at time t+l, v is belief-accessible from u despite the fact that it was not at time t, 
then it must be the case that every w which was belief-accessible from u at time t is not 
knowledge-accessible fiom u at time t+l. Thus  (P2) rules out arbitrary expansions of the 
belief set (cf. Figure 1). 
P  R 0  P 0  S I  T I 0  N  2. If  property (R3)  is satisfied and, for all t~ T, Bt is 
euclidean, then the conjunction of properties (Rl) and (R2) implies the conjunction of 
properties (P 1) and (P2). 
Proof: First we prove (PI.). Fix arbitrary u and v such that uBtv and uKt+,v.  We 
need to show that ulB,,v.  By (Rl) there exists a w such that uBtw and wBt+,v.  Since 
Bt+,  is euclidean, vBt+,v.  Since: uXt+,v  and  vBt+,v,  by (R3)  it follows that uBt+,v. 
Next we prove (P2). Note that (P2) can be written as (is equivalent to) 
V u,v,we W,  uBt+,v & uKt+,w  & uBtw a  uBtv. Fix arbitrary u,v and w such that 
uBt+,v, uKt+,w  and uBtw. By (1'1)  [which was proved above], since uBtw and uKt+,w, 
it follows that u!B,,w.  By euclicleanness of Bt+,,  since uBt+,v  and uBt+,w,  we have that 
wBt+,v. This, together with  u2j\w, yields, by (R2), u23,v.  H 
We postpone until the next section a discussion of  what is needed in order to 
prove a partial converse of  Proposition 2. The following proposition, together with Proposition 2, identifies a system that 
provides an axiomatization of the: notion of persistency of beliefs (for a further discussion 
see the next section).13 
P  R 0  P 0  S l  T I0  N 3. Let  X be the system obtained by adding to  the 
following axiom schemata: for every t~ T,  -Bt+ +  BtlBt+  (negative introspection of 
beliefs), (Al), (A2) and (A3). Then E  is sound and complete with respect to the class of 
models where: (1) V t~ T, Bt is euclidean, (2) properties (Rl), (R2) and (R3)  are satisfied. 
Proposition 3, again, can be seen as an application of Theorem 4.3 (2) in van der 
Hoek (1993, p. 183). For the reader's convenience, and because van der Hoek does not 
provide a complete proof, we give the proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix. 
C 0  R 0  L  LA  RY 1 . The system E axiomatizes the notion of belief persistency. 
Proof: It follows from Proposition 3 and Proposition 2.  W 
Notice that, under many respects, 2 is a weaker system than the one normally 
used in applications. In particular, modeling knowledge by means of information 
partitions implies assuming vericlicality (Kt+ +  #), and negative introspection 
(lKtt) +  Kt1Ktt)),  for the knowledge operator, which are not assumed in Proposition 3. 
Indeed, no assumptions concerning the knowledge operator are made in Proposition 3 
(aside from axiom (A3) which concerns the relation between knowledge and belief), 
l3 Recall that  a logic is  sourid and  complete with respect to  a class  C of models if: (i) every 
theorem of the logic (that is, every formula that can be derived from the axioms by means of the rules of 
inference) is valid in every model in  C,  and (ii) every formula that  is valid in every model in  C  is  a 
theorem of the logic. although one would probably want to require at least KD45 (or weak S5) for 
knowledge.'4  Similarly, modeling beliefs with (the support of conditional) probability 
distributions implies (see Halpern, 1991) assuming not only negative introspection, but 
also consistency (Bt+ +  7Bt+:)  and positive introspection (Bt+ -+  BtBt+),  for the belief 
operator, which are not assumed in Proposition 3. For a furlher discussion of this point 
see the next section.  The following example, illustrated in Figure 2,  shows the principle 
of belief persistency applied to a1 situation where both knowledge and belief satis@ the 
logic of KD45  (semantically, X, and $  for t =  0, 1, are serial,15 transitive and 
euclidean), but knowledge is not veridical, that is, the Truth Axiom does not hold for Kt 
(semantically, the relation Kt is not reflexive). 
(v,~),  (v,x), (w,v), (w,w), (w,x), (x,v), (x,w), (x,x)l, X*  = {(u,v), (u,w), (v,v), (v,w), 
(w,v;), (w,w), (x,x)l, 4  = { (u,w), (u;x), (v,w), (v,x), (w,w), (Wd, (x,w), (x,x)l, 
B,  = { (u,w), (v,~),  (w,~),  (x,~)].  In Figure 2 the relation Xt is represented by thick 
arrows and thick shapes, while the relation Bt is represented by thin arrows and thin 
shapes (if a set S of worlds is enclosed in a thick shape, then the relation Kt restricted to 
this set is universal, that is, yK,z  for all y,z~  S; similarly for thin shapes and the relation 
B.  Thus if the true state is u, then at date 0 the individual considers v, w and x possible 
l4 In Chellas (1980) KD45  is the system where the knowledge operator satisfies the following 
axiom schemata: 
K-  Kt(+ +  v) + st+  +  Ktv) 
D.  Kt+ +  7Ki-t+  (consistency) 
4.  Kt$ +  KtKt+  (positive introspection) 
5.  -Kt+  -+  Kt7Kt+ (negative introspection). 
It the Truth Axiom (Kt+ -+ +)  is added then the corresponding system is called S5 or KT5. 
l5 A relation R is serial if for every u there is a v such that uRv. (i.e. cannot rule out any of them), but attaches positive probability only to w and x. At 
date 1 the individual learns that tlhe true state is not x and she now attaches probability 1 
to w. Let n:, be a proposition whose truth set is {v, w, x) and n:,  a proposition whose truth 
set is {w,x). Then at date 0 and a,t state u, the individual knows (and believes) that 7cl and 
does not know but believes that ?;c2.  At date 1 and state u the individual still (knows and 
believes that 7cl and) believes that 7c2.  At both dates the individual is wrong in her 
knowledge and belief. 
date 0  date I 
Figure 2 
3. Discussion 
It was remarked after Corollary 1 that, although Proposition 3 does not require 
any assumptions about the knowledge operator and only negative introspection for the 
belief operator (as well as the axiom that beliefs are conscious), reasonable 
axiomatizations of knowledge (or "hard beliefs") would require at least consistency and positive and negative introspection, that is, at least the logic of KD45 (or weak S5: cf. 
footnote 14). Semantically, this translates into the requirement that Xt be serial, transitive 
and euclidean. Furthermore, if beliefs (that is, "soft" beliefs) at a world u are represented 
by the support of a probability distribution over the set of nodes that are knowledge- 
accessible fiom u, then Bt would also satisfy KD45 (see Halpern, 199  1). Moreover, for 
beliefs to be based on knowledge, it is also necessary to postulate that the individual 
believes everything that she knows: 
The following lemma is proved in the appendix. 
LEMMA 1.  Axiom schema (A4) is characterized by the following property 
(R4)  \J u,v~  W,  V t~ T,  if uBtv then  uXtv. 
Furthermore, the standard canonical model. (see the appendix) of a system that contains 
(A4) satisfies property (R4). 
From now on we shall restrict attention to systems where both the knowledge and 
the belief'  operators satisfl the logic of KD45 and, furthermore, axiom schemata (A3) 
(consciousness of beliefs) and ('44)  (what .is known is believed) are postulated. 
Restricting attention to such systems, does the converse of Proposition 2 hold? 
The answer is negative, as the following example shows. 
EXAMPLE  2.  Let T = (1,2), W = (u,v}, 3(0 = B,, = {(u,v),(v,v)} and X, = 
23,  = {(su),(v,u)}. This model, which is illustrated in Figure 3, satisfies the following 
properties: (1) for every t = 0,1, Xt and 13,  are serial, transitive and euclidean, 
(2) properties (W),  (R4), (PI) and (P2) are satisfied. Yet  both (Rl) and (R2) are violated. date 0 
Figure  3  1 
date 1 
At each date t =:  0,1, X, == Zt  is represented by arrows. 
However, if the Truth Axiom is added for the knowledge operator: Kt@  +  4, that 
is, if knowledge satisfies the logic of KT5 (or S5: see footnote 14) then the conjunction of 
(Pl)  and (P2) becomes equivalent to the conjunction of (Rl)  and (R2), as the following 
proposition shows. 
P  R 0  P 0  S l  T I0  N 4.  Suppose that properties (R3) and (R4) are satisfied and, 
for every t~  T, iB, is euclidean and Kt  is reflexive. Then the conjunction of (PI) and (P2) 
is equivalent to the conjunction of  (R1  ) and (R2). 
Proof:  By  Proposition  2  it  is  enough  to  prove  that  (PI)  &  (P2)  implies 
(Rl) & (R2). In fact, we will show the stronger result that (PI) implies (Rl) and (P2) 
implies (R2). (Pl) a  (Rl): Let u,v~  FY be such that uBtv. We want to show that there exists a 
WE W such that uBtw and wBt,-,v. Choose w = v. Then we only have to show that 
vBt+,v.  By reflexivity of X,,  , vKt+,v.  By euclideanness of  Bt , vqv.  By (PI), since 
vBtv and vXt+,v, vBt+,v. 
(P2) a  @2): Let u,v,w~  W be such that uBtv and v29,,w. We need to show that 
uBtw. By reflexivity of Kt+,,  v:7Ct+,v.  By euclideanness of Bt, vBtv. Thus  we have: 
vZt+,w and  vX,,v  and  vBtv. 
By (P2) this implies vBtw. By (R4),  since uBtv, qv.  By (R3),  since uqv  and vBtw, it 
follows that uBtw. 
To conclude our discuss:ion, we shall consider a fifth, and last, axiom schema: 
This axiom captures the notion of  perfect memory or recall: if the individual knows that 
+ at date t then she will know that 4 at every future date. In the case where knowledge is 
represented by information partitions, (A5) corresponds to the semantic assumption that 
the information partition of the :individual at time t+l is a refinement of her information 
partition at time t. The following lemma is proved in the appendix 
LEMMA 2. Axiom sche:ma (A5) is characterized by the following property 
(R5)  V U,VE  W, V t~ T,  if  uKt+,v then  uKtv. 
Furthermore, the standard canonical model of a system that contains (A5) satisfies 
property (W. 
Axiom (A5) plays no role in our results. Thus our axiomatization of the 
conditionalization rule applies also to situations where memory is lacking, as shown in 
the example of Figure 4 below (where, as before, thick lines denote the information partitions that represent knowledge, and thin lines denote the supports of the conditional 
probability distributions that represent beliefs). 
F: - 
date t  date t+l 
Figure 4 
4.  Related literature 
We conclude with a revie:w of related literature. The atemporal relationship 
between knowledge and belief was first analyzed in Kraus  and Lehmann  (1  988). In 
particular, the atemporal version of our axioms (A3) (consciousness of beliefs) and (A4) 
(what is known is also believed) can be found there. Kraus  and Lehmann postulated the 
full S5 logic for knowledge, consistency (El+ +  TB-4)  for beliefs, and (A3) and (A4) for 
the interaction between knowledge and beliefs.  They showed that positive and negative 
introspection for the belief operator are theorems of this system. Kraus and Lehmann also 
considered a multi-agent logic with operators for common knowledge and common 
belief. In the last part of the paper the authors considered the possibility of extending the logic to include a time operator. In particular, they addressed the question of how to 
characterize the notion of persistency of beliefs: "if person i believes something, he will 
keep on believing it until he knows it is false" (1988, p. 107). They listed, and briefly 
discussed, a number of possible axioms (we mentioned, and criticized, one of them in the 
introduction) and concluded by saying that "An open problem is: find a natural family of 
models for which the systems considered above are complete". 
One property of the system considered by Kraus and Lehmann is that if one adds 
the axiom schema B+ -+ BK+ then knowledge and belief become identical, that is, one 
obtains the theorem B+  t,  K+.  This point is taken up by van der Hoek (1993) in an 
extensive analysis of the causes of this "problem"  and of a similar system that allows one 
to introduce the axiom B+ -+ BIK+  without obtaining a collapse of belief into knowledge. 
An extensive analysis of' knowledge in a temporal context can be found in 
Halpern and Vardi (1989). Arnolng the issues considered are: whether or not the 
individual16 forgets, whether or not she learns, whether or not time is synchronous, and 
whether or not there is a unique initial state in the system. The objective of their paper is 
to characterize the complexity of the validity problem for all the logics considered. 
Somewhat related is also Scherl and Levesque (1  995). The authors use situation 
calculus to model actions and their effects on the world. Axioms are used to specify the 
prerequisites of actions as well as their effects, that is, the fluents that they change. The 
analysis centers on knowledge-:producing actions, that is, actions whose effects are to 
change a state of knowledge. Knowledge is modeled as veridical: reflexivity of the 
accessibility relation for knowledge turns out to be crucial for their results. An interesting 
l6  The authors are  actually interested in  modeling knowledge and time for distributive systems 
and therefore talk about the knowledge of a processor, rather than an individual. aspect of Scherl and Levesque's analysis is that memory emerges as a side-effect: if 
something is known in a certain situation, it remains known at successor situations, 
unless something relevant has changed. 
One more paper which is relevant to the issues considered here is Halpern (1991), 
which studies the relation between knowledge and certainty, where a fact is known  if it is 
true at all worlds an individual considers possible and certain if it holds with probability 
1. Halpem shows that if one assumes one fixed probability assignment (such an 
assumption would correspond, in our framework, to axiom (A3)) then the logic KD45 
provides a complete axiomatizatilon for reasoning about certainty. However,  Halpem 
does not deal with the issue of the evolution of knowledge and belief over time. 
Some of the papers reviewed above deal with the apparently more general case 
where there are n 2  1 individuals, whereas we have restricted attention to the case of one 
individual. It should be clear, however, that our results apply also to the multi-agent case 
(the only modification required in the statement of the results and in the proofs is the 
attachment of a superscript i to the episternic operators and the accessibility relations, 
where the index i ranges over the set of agents). Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Proof of (1).  (A). Let W  be a model that satisfies 
property (Rl). Fix arbitrary UE Vi, t~ T and an arbitrary formula 4. Suppose that 
C  "  BtBt+,+.  We want to show that C  Bt+, that is, that for all v such that uBtv, C '  +.  u  u  v 
Fix an arbitrary v such that u2lv. By the assumed property, there exists a w such that 
m  m  m  uBtw and wBwlv. Since uBtw and Cu  BtBt+,4. Cw  Bt+& and,  since wBt+,v,  4.  v 
(B). Let (w, T,  ) be a Me  that violates property (Rl). Then 
there exist t~ T and U,VE  W such that uiB,v and, for all ws  W, if uBtw, then not wQv. 
Let n be a propositional variable and  9V  a model where the truth set of n is the set of 
worlds that can be reached fiom u in two steps, first with Bt and then with Bt+,,  that is, 
f(n) = {ZE  W :  for some XE W, uBtx and xBt+,z).  Then ve  f(n). Hence (since uBtv) 
kt'  Btn. On the other hand, by definition of f(n), C  BtBt+,n.  U  u 
Proof of (2). (A). Let W  be a model that satisfies property (R2). Fix arbitrary 
us  W, ts  T and an arbitrary formula 4. Suppose that C '  Bt4. We want to show that  u 
m  C  BtBt+,+.  Fix arbitrary v and w such that uBtv and vBt+,w.  By the assumed property, 
uBtw. Hence, since c a  Bt+, C  7  4. 
(B). Let (w, T,  {B,}teT)  be a Me  that violates property (R2). Then 
there exist t~ T and U,V,WE  W such that uBtv and vlB,,w and not uBtw. Let n be a 
propositional variable and W  a model where f(n) = {zs  W : uBtz 1).  Thus C '  Btn. On  u 
the other hand, since we  f(n), #'  B,Bt+,n. 
Ill 
Proof of (3).  (A). Let  W be a model that satisfies property (R3).  Fix arbitrary 
us  W, t~ T and an arbitrary formula 4. Suppose that C '  Bt$. We want to show that 
U C:  KtBt$. Fix arbitrary v and w such that uXtv  and vBtw. By the assumed property, 
m  m  uBtw. Hence, since t  Bt$,  !==  4. 
(B). Let (w, T, {Xt)tE,,  { Bt),, ,  ) be a frame that violates property (R3). Then 
there exist t~ T and u,v,wc W such that uKtv  and vBtw and not uqw.  Let n be a 
propositional variable and  R7  a model where f(n)  = {ZE  W : uBtz 1).  Thus C '  Btn. On  u 
the other hand, since we @),  YBp.  u 
Proof of Proposition 3.  (1) follows from a standard soundness and completeness 
theorem for modal logic (see Chellas, 1980). That (Al), (A2) and (A3) are valid in this 
class of models follows from Pr~~position  I. Thus we only need to prove completeness. We 
proceed in the usual way. Let  ?@ = (w, T,  {Bt)tET,  f :  ll+ 2W  ) be the standard 
canonical model for C.  That is, W is the set of maximal consistent sets of formulae, uKtv 
iff  {+ :  Kt+  E U) C_  v and uBtv iff  {+ : Bt+  E U) c  V. Furthermore, for every sentence letter 
n, f(n) = {WE W :  n E w)  . To prove completeness it is enough to show that the canonical 
model satisfies properties (Rl), ((R2)  and (R3)  (cf. Chellas, 1980). 
Proof of (Rl). Choose arbitrary t~ 'r and U,VE  W such that uBtv, that is, 
{+ :  Bt$ E U) c  V.  We want to show that there exists a WE W such that {$ : Bt$ E U) c  w 
and  {$ : B,,+  E W) G  V.  By Theorem 4.29 in Chellas (1 980, p.  l58), {$ : B,,$  E w) c_  v 
if and only if  {TB~+,~~J  : YE V) c  W. Thus we want to find a WE W such that 
r u  A E w, where r = {+ : Bt+  ci U) and A = {lBt+,-y  :  y~ E V)  . By Lindenbaum's 
lemma, this is equivalent to showing that r v A is consistent. Suppose it is not 
consistent. Then there exist $ ,, ..., $nf r and  7Bt+llyrl,  .  .  ., lBt+17~m~  A (with n 20, 
m20 and n+m 21) such that 1(+1  A ... A $,  A lB,,y,  A ... A lBt+,+y,) is a theorem of 
C.  [Note that it must be m t  1 because, otherwise, we would have that  l(+,  A ... A +n ) is a theorem of  X,  contradicting the assumption that, for every i = 1, ..., n,  +i~  v and v is 
a maximal consistent set of formulae.] By propositional logic this is equivalent to 
(4,  A ... A +J +  (Bt+l~~l  v ... v Bt+,+ym)  [in the case where n = 0, we would have that 
(Bt+~l%  ... v Bt+Il~m)  is a theorem of  El. By the rule of inference RK (see Chellas, 
1980, p. 121) for B,  it follows that @,+,  A ... A Bt+J -+ Bt(Bt+,+yl  v ... v Bt+ll~m)  is a 
theorem of Z:  [in the case where: n = 0, by the rule of necessitation for Br we would have 
that B,(Bt+,+yl v ... v BWl+ym),  which is (i) below, is a theorem of Z]. Hence it belongs 
to u. Since, for every i = 1, ..., n,  Btbi€  u (because gie  I?),  it follows that @,$,  A ... A 
Bt+&  u and therefore 
Since (B,+,~W,  v -.a  v Bt+l+,)  -+ Bt+,(1vl  v ... v lvm)  is a theorem of every normal 
system (see Chellas, 1980, p. 123), it belongs to u. Hence by the rule of inference RM 
(see Chellas,, 1980, p.114) the fcdlowing formula belongs to u: 
B,(B,llvI  v ... v Bt+,1ym)  -+ B, Bt+l(lvl v ... v 1ym).  It follows from (i) that 
B, Bt+,(y1  v ... v +qrn)e  U.  Since Z contains axiom schema (Al), the following formula 
is in u: B, B,,(ly~, v ... v lv,)  -+ B,(lvl v ... v lyl,).  Hence Bt(1v1  v ... v TW,) 
belongs to u.  Since uBtv, it follows that (lv,  v ... v lyl,)~  v. By propositional logic, 
(lty,  v ... v -qm)  is equivalent to +tq1  A ... A w,).  Hence 
1(~1  A ... A W,)E  v  (ii). 
On the other hand, for every j =  1, .  .  .,  m, WE  v  (since 1Bt+,1vj  E  A). Thus 
J 
But (ii) and (iii) together imply that v is inconsistent, contradicting the assumption that 
VE W, that is, that v is a maximal consistent set of formulae. Proof of (R2). Fix arbitriuy t E T and u,v,w~  W such that uB,v and vB,+,w. 
Choose an arbitrary formula y such that B,~E  u. We need to show that y E w. Since, by 
(4,  (Bp -t BtBt+,y)  is a theorem of Z,  (Bty -t BtBt+,y)~  u. Hence BtBt+,ys  U.  Since 
uBtv, B,,~E v and since vBt+,w,  VE w. 
Proof of (R3).  Fix arbitriuy t~ T and yv,w~  W such that u-X,v and vqw. Choose 
an arbitrary formula y such that B,y s u. We need to show that y s w. Since, by (A3), 
(Bty -t KtBty)  is a theorem of 2, (B,y +  KtBty)s u. Hence KtBty€ u. Since uX,v, 
B,WE  vandsincevBtw,y~  W.  H 
Proof of Lemma 1. (A). Let ?I?  be a model that satisfies property (R4). Fix 
arbitrary UE W, ts  T and an arbitrary formula 4. Suppose that I= '  Kt+. Choose an 
U 
arbitrary v such that uBtv. Then, by the assumed property, uKtv, hence C '  4.  v 
(B).  Let (w, T,  {Bt)te,  ) be a fiame that violates property (R4). Then 
there exist t~ T and u,vs W such that uBtv and not tKtv.  Let n be a propositional 
variable and  W  a model where f(n) = W-  {v). Then b  Ktn. On the other hand, since  u 
Now fix a system that contains axiom schema (A4) and consider the 
corresponding standard canonical model. We want to show that it satisfies property (R4). 
Fix arbitrary ts  T and u,v~  W such that uBtv. Choose an arbitrary formula y such that 
Kty  E u. We need to show that \IJE v. Since, by (A4),  O(,W -t Bty)  is a theorem of the 
system,  (Kty +  Bty)s  u. Hence B,~E  u. Since uBtv, WE  V. . Proof of Lemma 2. (A). ]Let W  be a model that satisfies property (R5).  Fix 
arbitrary us  W, t E T and an arbibmy formula 0. Suppose that C  Kt$. Choose an  u 
m  arbitrary v such that uXt+,v.  By the assumed property, uX,v, hence C  4. 
(B).  Let (w, T, {Kt}  , (  Bt}  tET  ) be a frame that violates property (R5).  Then 
there exist t~ T and qv~  W such that uX,,v and not qv.  Let x be a propositional 
variable and  n] a model where f(n) =  {we W :  uX,w). Then C  Kp. On the other 
U 
Now fix a system that conitains axiom schema (A5) and consider the 
corresponding standard canonical model. We want to show that it satisfies property (R5). 
Fix arbitrary t~ T and u,vs W such that u9Ct+,v. Choose an arbitrary formula y such that 
Kty s u. We need to show that WE  V.  Since, by (AS),  O(,y +  Kt+Iy)  is a theorem of the 
system,  (K,y +  K,+,~)E  u. Hence K,+,wE u. Since uXt+,v,  WE  V. . References 
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